

The paper uses Augustine's description of 'preliminary' joy (*gaudium*) in *De Civitate Dei* 16.31 to show that although his theory of the emotions preserves essential elements of the Stoic account (especially its cognitivism), it moves beyond the Stoics in two important respects. First, it includes preliminaries to morally good emotions (reactions which would perhaps be referred to as 'proeupatheiai,' had such a category existed for the Stoics), whereas the pagan Stoic accounts known to Augustine (Cicero, Gellius and Seneca) included only 'preliminary passions', i.e. affective reactions occurring prior to assent of the mind but leading up to morally bad emotions (the so-called *propatheiai*, or *primus motus*). Second, Augustine moved beyond the Stoic account by positing a cognitive cause for these preliminaries. It had been an unresolved problem in the Stoic account that preliminary passions were said to occur without the engagement of the mind; the Stoics' otherwise thorough commitment to rational psychology, and their claim that emotions properly so called (*pathē* or *eupatheiai*) were reducible to judgments, would seem to require that any sort of affective reaction have some cognitive cause. Augustine resolved the problem by positing that doubt is the cause of preliminary emotions. Thus *De Civitate Dei* 16.31 speaks of *dubitans in gaudio*, contrasting this affective condition with *credens in gaudio* (cf. 16.24, 16.26). (These findings complement earlier research showing that Augustine described doubt as the cognitive cause of preliminaries to morally *bad* emotions in his sermons: S. Byers, "Augustine and the Cognitive Cause of Stoic 'Preliminary Passions' (*Propatheiai*)," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* XLI (2003), 433-448).

In terms of the larger question of 'Christianity and the emotions', the passage has a certain importance for counterbalancing the gloomy picture of Christian emotional life which has sometimes emerged in the secondary literature. It shows that Augustine focuses on joy as a characteristic emotion of the virtuous life, and on preliminary joy as an affective reaction of those on the path to virtue but not yet arrived. While it is true that guilt and the imperative to avoid lust are found in Augustine and other Christian authors (so R. Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind* (New York: Oxford U. Press, 2000)), attention to the privileged place of joy is necessary lest we be deceived by a truth in isolation.

Finally, it is noteworthy that this passage from the *De Civitate Dei*, which is an exegesis of Genesis 18:10, helps to substantiate the theory of Paramelle that Augustine had a Latin translation or faithful summary of book four of Philo's *Quaestiones et Solutiones in Genesim* (see J. Paramelle, *Philon d'Alexandrie Questions sur la Genèse II 1-7* (Genève: P. Cramer, 1984)). Augustine's exegesis is similar to Philo's *Quaestiones et Solutiones in Genesim* 4.16 in important ways, and has more in common with Philo than with Ambrose or Origen on this scripture passage.