

At *Protagoras* 349E1-350C5 Socrates argues for the identity of courage and knowledge, and at 350C6-351B2 Protagoras objects to Socrates' argument. Between 1961 and 1985, a few valuable contributions in English were made to the interpretation of these passages: O' Brien (1961); Devereux (1975); Taylor (1976); Weiss (1985). None, however, is entirely satisfactory. And in the last twenty years, among some cursory treatments in studies not particularly focused on these passages, no notable progress has been made.

The objective of this paper is to present a more satisfactory interpretation of Socrates' argument and Protagoras' objection, in particular by engaging with a set of problems with which previous commentators have wrestled. Above all, I will be concerned with Taylor's examination of these problems since his contribution remains the most thorough and well known in English.

The upshot of my discussion is that both Socrates' argument and Protagoras' response are more cogent than has been recognized. Indeed, Protagoras suggests a good reason to believe that Socrates' argument fails to identify courage and knowledge. This also explains Socrates' development of a second argument for the identity of courage and knowledge (351B-360E).