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**Structure and process and the causes of the Peloponnesian War**

International Relations scholars working in the realist tradition have often claimed Thucydides as the first writer in that tradition (Viotti & Kauppi 1999). Contemporary neorealists have found in the ancient Athenian a scientist with theoretical moorings in certain axiomatic beliefs: the primacy of states as actors, the anarchy of international relations, the primacy of power and security in human motivation, and the state's rational calculation of self-interest. They have also found in his famous pronouncement about the "truest cause" that sort of structural determinism which sometimes is said to characterize their own theories about growth of power, systemic disequilibrium, and war. Thucydides, when he speaks of the growth in Athenian power causing Spartan fear and making war inevitable, becomes "the first political scientist" to take note of the connection between differential growth of power among states and hegemonic war (R. Gilpin 1981). The problem with all this, says R.N. Lebow 1991, is that Thucydides' statement about the truest cause "is contradicted by evidence from (his) own narrative. This indicates that war was neither inevitable nor primarily the result of Spartan fear of Athens." The narrative in fact discloses the important role of "the remarkably bad judgments made by the leaders of the several involved powers." But that is not all. The narrative also forces us to see the explanatory limits of structural realism (i.e. distribution-of-power structuralism) and to show greater appreciation for other aspects of state- and system-structure, and in particular for the effect on these structures of "process," i.e. "patterns of interaction" such as those arising from "communication and cooperation" (Keohane and Nye 1977).

D. Garst 1989 similarly stresses the limitations of structural realism, faulting it for "its inability to account for the speeches and debates." Citing J.B. White 1984, Garst stresses the need, when dealing with Thucydides' work, to "unravel its "'complex rhetorical universe' and 'culture of argument,' consisting of the 'discourse, the conventions of argument and action' by which the Greek city-states 'maintain and regulate their relations with one another'." This culture of argument is a culture shared by all the Greek states and as such constitutes a mode "communication and cooperation," one which establishes a "pattern of interaction."

This paper studies ways in which diplomatic and foreign policy speeches exhibit the rhetorical use of shared political ideology. To understand this ideology, we must begin with the rhetoric of Athenian domestic politics, focusing our attention on the position of such concepts as freedom, equality, personal prestige, distributive justice, and pleonexia within the Athenians' democratic ideology. These same concepts, when viewed in the context of Greek interstate diplomacy and negotiation, may help us understand how communication processes contributed at least as much to the outbreak of war as did structure and concerns about distribution of power.